INSIGHTS
Light at the end of the tunnel? Gibraltar dispute reviews key FIDIC Yellow Book provisions
14/09/2014
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INSIGHTS
Light at the end of the tunnel? Gibraltar dispute reviews key FIDIC Yellow Book provisions
September 14, 2014
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As disputes under the FIDIC forms of contract are normally resolved in private Dispute Adjudication Board (“DAB”) proceedings or confidential arbitration proceedings, reported FIDIC cases are rare and often of considerable precedential value either formally or informally. This article considers one such recent decision which was transferred from the Gibraltar courts specified in the particular conditions of the contract (in lieu of arbitration) to the more specialised Technology and Construction Court of England and Wales by the agreement of the parties during the pre-action protocol process.
The case was Obrascon Huarte Lain SA v Her Majesty’s Attorney General for Gibraltar1 and concerned a dispute arising out of a £30 million contract for design and construction work to the Gibraltar Airport (“the contract”). The contract incorporated the FIDIC Conditions of Contract for Plant and Design Build for Electrical and Mechanical Plant, and for Building and Engineering Works, designed by the Contractor, 1st Edition 1999, commonly known as the Yellow Book.
Under the current arrangements, the road to the Spanish border (the Winston Churchill Avenue) traverses the airport runway so that the road must be closed when the runway is in use. In an attempt to relieve the congestion caused by the frequent closure of this road, the works included the construction of a new dual carriageway road and a twin bore tunnel under the eastern end of the airport runway, known as the Frontier Access Road.
The contract was entered into in November 2008 and works commenced in December 2008. After over two-and-a-half years of work on the two- year project, when little more than 25% of the work had been done, the contract was terminated. The large Spanish civil engineering company 1 Obrascon Huarte Lain SA v Her Majesty’s Attorney General for Gibraltar [2014] EWHC 1028 (TCC); [2014] BLR 484 Obrascon Huarte Lain (“OHL”) was the contractor. It commenced proceedings against the employer, the Government of Gibraltar 2 . Although Gibraltar is famous for its rock and despite the airport site’s historic military use, the contractor argued inter alia that it had encountered more rock and contaminated material in the ground excavated on the site than would have been reasonably foreseeable by an experienced contractor at the time of tender. The contractor also argued that as a result of a report it had commissioned, which concluded that airborne contamination on the site posed a serious risk to the health of those working in the tunnel, it was necessary to suspend the tunnel excavation works and re-design the tunnel. There followed very little activity by the contractor between 20 December 2010 (the date of the report) and 28 July 2011 (the date of the employer’s notice of termination). During this period of inactivity the contractor suggested a new budget of some £98 million (over three times the original contract price) would be needed to complete the works.
The court disagreed with the contractor’s arguments and found, inter alia, that the contractor had failed to proceed with the design and execution of the works with due expedition and without delay. It awarded the contractor just one day extension of time from the 660 days originally claimed (reduced to 474 days in the amended particulars of claim submitted during the trial itself). The court was especially critical of the report heavily relied upon by the contractor to support its suspension of the works and redesign of the tunnel, which it described as “palpably and obviously inept, was clearly worked on by OHL and cannot have been considered by OHL to be independent or competent”.
The main issue revolved around the termination of the contract. The court found that the contractor was responsible both in law and fact for the termination and that the employer had lawfully terminated the contract. In determining responsibility for the termination of the contract, the court considered the following matters which are discussed in this article:
- Was the engineer entitled to issue notice to correct on 16 May 2011
and/or 5 July 2011 under clause 15.1? - Was the employer entitled to terminate the contract under clause
15.2? In particular:
(a) Did the contractor fail to comply with the notice to correct pursuant to clause 15.2(a)? 2 The Howard Kennedy International Construction team (formerly Corbett & Co.) acted on behalf of the Government of Gibraltar in this case. 3 Paragraph 332.© Informa UK plc 2014 a commercially sensible construction and one to be encouraged; the construction industry would not benefit from trivial contractual failures giving rise to notices to correct, which if not complied with, would in turn lead to contractual termination. Mr Justice Akenhead supported his view with reference to various authorities 4 . He emphasised that what is trivial and what is significant or serious, will depend on the facts and gave the example that one day’s culpable delay on a 730-day contract or 1m² of defective paintwork out of 10,000m² good paintwork would not, if reasonable and sensible commercial persons had anything to do with it, justify termination even if the contractor did not comply with the clause 15.1 notice. Nonetheless, despite this very well- reasoned guidance, it cannot be ignored that on its face the express wording “any obligation” in clause 15.1 is very broad indeed. It perhaps remains open to argument in other forums and jurisdictions that a failure to carry out any obligation need not be an important or material obligation. There is also no express time limitation, so in theory it might be possible for the notice to correct to deal with a failure which occurred months or years earlier and which then had, and still has, no significant impact on the contractor’s operation (provided that it can still be remedied). Hopefully, the next edition of the FIDIC Yellow Book will resolve any ambiguity.
Mr Justice Akenhead’s second point was that the specified time for compliance within the clause 15.1 notice must be reasonable in all the circumstances prevailing at the time of the notice. He gave the example that if 90% of the workforce had gone down with cholera at that time, the period given for compliance would need reasonably to take that into account, even if that problem was the contractor’s risk. He said that it may well be relevant to take into account whether the clause 15.1 notice is coming out of the blue or if the subject-matter has been raised before and the contractor has chosen to ignore what it has been told. He emphasised that what is reasonable is fact sensitive 5 .
His third point was that clause 15.1 is designed to give the contractor an opportunity and a right to correct its previous and identified contractual failure.
His final point was that given the potentially serious consequence of non-compliance, clause 15.1 notices need to be construed strictly but may be construed against the surrounding facts 6 . 4 Lord Diplock in Antaios Compania Naviera SA v Salen Rederierna AB [1985] AC 191 at 201D; [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 235; [1984] 3 WLR 592; [1984] 3 All ER 229, Hudson’s Building and Engineering Contracts , 12th Edition, paragraph 8.056, Lord Steyn in Mannai Investment Co Ltd v Eagle Star Assurance Company Ltd (HL) [1997] UKHL 19; [1997] AC 749; [1997] 2 WLR 945; [1997] 3 All ER 352. 5 See, for example, Shawton Engineering Ltd v DGP International Ltd (t/a Design Group Partnership) (CA) [2005] EWCA Civ 1359 at paragraph 69. 6 Mannai Investment Co Ltd v Eagle Star Assurance Company Ltd [1997] UKHL 19 per Lord Steyn.
WAS THE EMPLOYER ENTITLED TO TERMINATE THE CONTRACT UNDER CLAUSE 15.2?
The court then reviewed clause 15.2 the contract, which states:
“15.2. The Employer shall be entitled to terminate the Contract if the Contractor:
(a) fails to comply … with a notice under sub-clause 15.1 …
(b) … plainly demonstrates the intention not to continue performance of his obligations under the Contract,
(c) without reasonable excuse fails:
(i) to proceed with the Works in accordance with clause 8 … or;
(ii) to comply with a notice issued under sub-clause 7.5 …
In any of these events or circumstances, the Employer may, upon giving 14 days’ notice to the Contractor, terminate the Contract and expel the Contractor from Site.”
The employer served a notice of termination on 28 July 2011 on the grounds set out in clauses 15.2(a), (b) and (c).
Clause 15.2(a)
The court was asked to decide whether, as at 28 July 2011, the employer was entitled to serve a notice of termination under clause 15.2(a) of the contract by reason of the contractor’s failure to remedy the defaults notified in notices to correct issued by the engineer on 16 May 2011 and/or 5 July 2011. Mr Justice Akenhead found that the employer was so entitled to serve a notice of termination on 28 July 2011 on the basis that the contractor had failed to comply with the clause 15.1 notices to correct. He was clear that the contractor’s right to re-design the tunnel did not outweigh its obligation to get on with the works 7 .
Clause 15.2(b)
In respect of clause 15.2(b) the court was asked to decide whether, as at 28 July 2011, the employer was entitled to serve a notice of termination pursuant to clause 15.2(b) of the contract because the contractor had demonstrated an intention not to continue with the performance of its obligations under the contract. Mr Justice Akenhead found that the employer was entitled to serve a notice of termination pursuant to clause 15.2(b) of the contract because the contractor had plainly demonstrated an intention not to continue with the performance of its obligations under the contract. He drew a verbal and contractual distinction between an intention to continue performance and an intention to continue performance of the contractual obligations. He said that a clear avowed intention to perform, but not by reference to important contractual terms, could demonstrate such an intention. The demonstration can be judged by reference not only to the words used but also to the actions. On the other hand, a simple disagreement between parties about what the contract meant, or disagreement about whether the contractor had some claim entitlement, would in itself not demonstrate such an intention 8 .
The court was also asked to decide whether any entitlement which the contractor might have had, as at 28 July 2011, to an extension of time for the completion of the works, would mean that the employer was no longer entitled to serve a notice of termination pursuant to clause 15.2(b) of the contract. Mr Justice Akenhead found that as the contractor was entitled to only one day’s extension of time as at 28 July 2011, such limited entitlement did not mean that the employer was no longer entitled to serve a notice of termination pursuant to clause 15.2(b) of the contract.
Clause 15.2(c)
In respect of clause 15.2(c) the court was asked to decide whether, as at 28 July 2011, the employer was entitled to serve a notice of termination pursuant to clause 15.2(c)(i) of the contract. Mr Justice Akenhead found that the employer was entitled to serve a notice of termination pursuant to clause 15.2(c)(i) of the contract because the contractor had failed to proceed with the works with due expedition and without delay and had therefore failed to proceed in accordance with clause 8.1, such as to give the employer an entitlement to terminate the works, and the contractor had no “reasonable excuse” for such failure. He was critical of the contractor who had “consciously and with its eyes open wrongly and wrongfully suspended the work … and within a few weeks had embarked on a wholly unnecessary re-design of the tunnel” 9 .
He further stated that the fact that liquidated damages (in this case Delay Damages) are permitted for the failure by the contractor to complete on time, does not qualify the right to terminate under clause 15.2 for failure to proceed with due expedition and without delay. The parties must be taken to have known that these were both remedies, albeit on its proper construction minor or insignificant breaches of the progress obligations would not justify termination under clause 15 10 .
Finally, in respect of both clauses 15.2(b) and (c), Mr Justice Akenhead gave two basic points of principle which are useful for general application 11 .
8 Paragraph 360.
9 Paragraph 357.
10 Paragraph 325.
11 Paragraph 356
Firstly, he said the test must be an objective one in relation to the grounds in both sub-paragraphs. So, if the contractor privately intended to stop work permanently but continued openly and assiduously to work hard at the site, this would not of itself give rise to a plain “demonstration” of intention not to continue performance. Similarly, the fact that the contractor was, and had for many months been, doing no work of any relevance without contractual excuse could, without more, objectively judged, give rise to a conclusion that it had failed to proceed in accordance with clause 8 for the purpose of clause 15.2(c)(i).
Secondly, he again emphasised that the grounds for termination must relate to significant and more than minor defaults on the part of the contractor on the grounds that it cannot mutually have been intended that a (relatively) draconian clause, such as a termination provision, should be capable of being exercised for insignificant or insubstantial defaults.
Therefore, he said a few days’ delay in the context of a two-year contract would not justify termination under clause 15.2(c)(i) and an unwillingness, or even refusal, to perform relatively minor obligations would not justify termination under clause 15.2(b).
In summary, he found that the contract was lawfully terminated by the employer on 20 August 2011 pursuant to clause 15.2 of the contract.
MUST THE BREACH OF CONTRACT WHICH IS RELIED UPON TO TERMINATE THE CONTRACT BE ANALOGOUS TO A REPUDIATORY BREACH OF CONTRACT?
The wording in clause 63.1 of the old FIDIC Red Book 1987 expressly permitted the employer to terminate the employment of the contractor where the engineer certified to the employer, with a copy to the contractor, that in its opinion the contractor had “repudiated the Contract” but this wording was deleted from the FIDIC 1999 editions.
Nonetheless, the contractor argued (with reference to various authorities) that, where “a contract contains a provision such as clause 15.2 which entitles an employer to terminate by reason of a failure to remedy a breach of contract which has been the subject of a clause 15.1 notice (or to terminate by reason of a breach of contract such as one of those of the type identified in clause 15.2(b) and (c)) the breach of contract that is relied upon must be serious and one which is analogous to a repudiatory breach of contract” 12 . Mr Justice Akenhead disagreed with the contractor’s argument. He stated that any suggestion that the breach of contract relied upon is analogous to a repudiatory breach of contract goes too far (at least as a general proposition) for a number of reasons.
12 Paragraph 322.
Firstly, he said it is necessary to consider each contract, whether it is a lease, leasehold development, construction or other commercial contract, on its own terms. For example, if the termination clause allows for termination “for any breach of contract no matter how minor”, the meaning is clear and does not require some repudiatory breach.
Secondly, most of the authorities referred to did not involve contracts like the contract in this case. The contract lists grounds on which termination can take place including clause 15.2(b) (where the contractor “plainly demonstrates the intention not to continue performance of his obligations under the Contract”) which is not unlike the test for English common law repudiation. This ground can be, and is, contractually distinguished from the other grounds, such as clause 15.2(c)(i) (failure “to proceed with the Works in accordance with clause 8”, that is in effect often a failure to proceed with “due expedition and without delay”). He queried why the contract would have both the “intention not to continue performance of [contractual] obligations” as well as failure to proceed with due expedition and without delay unless they are, or can be, two separate grounds.
Thirdly, the cases relied upon by the contractor in its submissions had a relatively simple right to terminate (for a, or any, breach). In this contract under clause 15.2(a) (failure “to comply … with a notice under sub-clause 15.1”) there was a warning mechanism whereby termination could be avoided by the contractor’s compliance with the clause 15.1 notice. In that sense, the contractor is given the chance to avoid termination whilst the simple termination for any breach can come out of the blue. Commercial parties would sensibly understand that this contractual chance is a warning as well to the contractor and the remedy is in its hands in that sense.
Finally, Mr Justice Akenhead accepted that the editors of Hudson’s Building and Engineering Contracts13 have properly set out the correct proposition that determination clauses such as this one will generally be construed as permitting termination for significant or substantial breaches as opposed to trivial, insignificant or insubstantial ones. He stated that this accords with commercial common sense.
WILL TERMINATION OCCUR IF THE CONTRACTOR HAS BEEN PREVENTED OR HINDERED FROM REMEDYING THE FAILURE FOR WHICH THE NOTICE TO CORRECT
IS GIVEN UNDER CLAUSE 15.1?
Although there was no suggestion that the employer had hindered or prevented the contractor, Mr Justice Akenhead was clear that termination could not legally occur if the contractor has been prevented or hindered 13 Hudson’s Building and Engineering Contracts , 12th Edition, paragraph 8.056 from remedying the failure for which the notice is given under clause 15.1 14 .
He stated that clauses 15.1 and 15.2(c) must, as a matter of common sense, pre-suppose that the contractor is given the opportunity by the employer actually to remedy the failure of which it is given notice under clause 15.1. In that context, termination could not legally occur if the contractor has been prevented or hindered from remedying the failure within the specified reasonable time. This stems from a necessarily implied term under English law that the employer shall not prevent or hinder the contractor from performing its contractual obligations; there is also almost invariably an implied term of mutual co-operation. Therefore, if the engineer has served a clause 15.1 notice to remedy a breach of contract, and the employer hinders or prevents the contractor from remedying the breach, the employer may not rely on the contractor’s failure in order to terminate the contract. This is because the employer should not be entitled to rely on its own breach to benefit by terminating 15 . He gave the example of an employer who, following the service of a clause 15.1 notice, denies site access to the contractor to enable it to put right the notified failure.
WAS THE NOTICE OF TERMINATION DATED 28 JULY 2011 A VALID AND EFFECTIVE NOTICE PURSUANT TO CLAUSE 15.2 BECAUSE IT WAS NOT SERVED AT THE ADDRESS FOR SERVICE OF THE CONTRACTOR AS STATED IN THE APPENDIX TO TENDER?
Clause 3.1 stated how communications were to be made:
“Wherever these Conditions provide for the giving or issuing of approvals, certificates, consents, determinations, notices and requests, these communications shall be:
(a) …
(b) Delivered, sent or transmitted to the address for the recipient’s communications as stated in the Appendix to Tender. However:
(i) If the recipient gives notice of another address, communications shall thereafter be delivered accordingly; and …”
The clause 15.2 notice of termination dated 28 July 2011 was sent by the employer to the contractor’s site office rather than to the contractor’s Madrid office, which was the address specified in the Appendix to Tender.
The contractor argued that it was therefore invalid and ineffective, and on 3 August 2011 wrote stating that this amounted to a repudiatory breach of the contract and purported to accept such repudiation. 14 Paragraph 324.
15 See for example, Alghussein Establishment v Eton College [1988] 1 WLR 587
The court was asked to decide whether the notice of termination dated 28 July 2011 was a valid and effective notice pursuant to clause 15.2 of the contract because it had not been sent to the address for service of the contractor as stated in the Appendix to Tender. It concluded that the employer’s notice of termination dated 28 July 2011 was a valid and effective notice pursuant to clause 15.2 of the contract.
Although the Madrid office was given in the Appendix to Tender, Mr Justice Akenhead noted that throughout the project, correspondence (including the clause 15.1 notices to correct) had been sent to the contractor’s site office without any objection. The project was being run by the contractor from the site office with this office handling the vast bulk of the correspondence, including letters, emails, and technical documentation such as method statements etc. The project manager, with very substantial authority, was based there. He found that in these circumstances, in effect and in practice the parties operated as if the site office was an appropriate address at which service of notices could be effected.
Relying on various authorities, 16 Mr Justice Akenhead drew the following conclusions when finding that service of the 28 July 2011 termination notice to the wrong address was not fatal.
His first conclusion was that termination of the parties’ relationship under the terms of such contracts is a serious step. There needs to be compliance with the contractual provisions to achieve an effective contractual termination.
Secondly, as a general rule, where notice has to be given to effect termination, it needs to be in sufficiently clear terms to communicate to the recipient clearly the decision to exercise the contractual right to terminate.
Thirdly, it is a matter of contractual interpretation, (i) as to the requirements for the notice, and (ii) whether each and every specific requirement is an indispensable condition without compliance with which the termination cannot be effective. He said that this interpretation needs to be tempered by reference to commercial common sense.
Fourthly, in the contract in this case, neither clause 1.3 nor clause 15.2 used words such as would give rise to any condition precedent or making the giving of notice served only at the contractor’s Madrid office a pre-condition to an effective termination. He said that the key elements of the notice procedure involve securing that the contractor is actually served with a written notice and receives the notice and, it being clear and unambiguous, that the notice is one being served under 16 Bremer HandelsGesellschaft MBH v Vanden (HL) [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 109, Worldpro Software Ltd v Desi Ltd [1997–98] TLR 279, Rennie v Westbury Homes (Holdings) Ltd (CA) [2007] EWCA Civ 1401, PHRJ Newbold and Others v The Coal Authority (CA) [2013] EWCA Civ 584; [2014] 1 WLR 1288 clause 15.2, namely that 14 days’ notice of termination is being given by the employer to the contractor, such as to enable it to expel the contractor from the site.
Fifthly, he said the primary purpose of clause 1.3 is to provide an arrangement whereby notices, certificates and other communications are effectively dispatched to, and received by, the contractor. The primary purpose of a clause 15.2 termination notice is to ensure that the contractor is made aware that its continued employment on the project is to be at an end.
His final conclusion was that the service of a clause 15.2 notice at the contractor’s Madrid office as such was not an indispensable requirement either of clause 15.2 or clause 1.3. Provided that service of a written clause 15.2 notice was actually effected on the contractor’s affiliates at a sufficiently senior level, then that would be suffi cient service to be effective. Mr Justice Akenhead stated that these conclusions applied both in relation to termination clauses in commercial and thus engineering and building contracts in general and specifically in relation to the contract in this case.
DID THE SERVICE OF THE TERMINATION NOTICE TO THE “WRONG” ADDRESS AMOUNT TO A REPUDIATION?
The contractor sought to argue that the service of the notice of termination dated 28 July 2011 to the wrong address was ineffective and thus amounted to a repudiation of the contract by the employer which it elected to accept on 3 August 2011, such that the contract was terminated on that date. Although Mr Justice Akenhead concluded that it was not necessary for him to decide this issue, 17 he stated that his findings would have been that the service of an otherwise valid and actually well-founded termination notice at the technically wrong address could not in law and on the facts of this case, amount to repudiation (with reference to various authorities 18 ).
Therefore, the contractor was not entitled to treat what was otherwise a legally and factually proper clause 15.2 termination notice as a repudiation (as it purported to do). Consequently, he found that the contractor itself repudiated the contract by the terms of its letter dated 3 August 2011 by wrongfully treating the contract as at an end, even though it was not accepted as such by the employer.
17 Paragraph 375.
18 Freeth v Burr (1874) LR 9 CP 208; [1874–80] All ER 751, Ross T Smyth & Co Ltd v T D Bailey, Son & Co
(HL) (1940) 67 Ll L Rep 147; [1940] 3 All ER 60; [1940] 56 TLR 825 and Eminence Property Developments
Ltd v Heaney [2011] 2 All ER 223